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Cryptanalysis of Two McEliece Cryptosystems
Based on Quasi-Cyclic Codes
Ayoub Otmani, Jean-Pierre Tillich and Le´onard Dallot
Abstract. We cryptanalyse here two variants of the McEliece cryptosystem
based on quasi-cyclic codes. Both aim at reducing the key size by restrict-
ing the public and secret generator matrices to be in quasi-cyclic form. The
first variant considers subcodes of a primitive BCH code. The aforementioned
constraint on the public and secret keys implies to choose very structured per-
mutations. We prove that this variant is not secure by producing many linear
equations that the entries of the secret permutation matrix have to satisfy
by using the fact that the secret code is a subcode of a known BCH code.
This attack has been implemented and in all experiments we have performed
the solution space of the linear system was of dimension one and revealed the
permutation matrix.
The other variant uses quasi-cyclic low density parity-check codes. This
scheme was devised to be immune against general attacks working for McEliece
type cryptosystems based on low density parity-check codes by choosing in the
McEliece scheme more general one-to-one mappings than permutation matri-
ces. We suggest here a structural attack exploiting the quasi-cyclic structure
of the code and a certain weakness in the choice of the linear transforma-
tions that hide the generator matrix of the code. This cryptanalysis adopts
a polynomial-oriented approach and basically consists in searching for two
polynomials of low weight such that their product is a public polynomial.
Our analysis shows that with high probability a parity-check matrix of a
punctured version of the secret code can be recovered with time complexity
O
(
n3
)
where n is the length of the considered code. The complete recon-
struction of the secret parity-check matrix of the quasi-cyclic low density
parity-check codes requires the search of codewords of low weight which can
be done with about 237 operations for the specific parameters proposed.
Keywords. McEliece cryptosystem, quasi-cyclic codes, BCH codes, LDPC
codes, cryptanalysis.
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1. Introduction
Since the introduction of the McEliece public-key cryptosystem [17], several at-
tempts have been made to propose alternatives to the classical Goppa codes. The
main motivation is to drastically reduce the size of the public and private keys,
which is of real concern for any concrete deployment. For instance, the parameters
suggested in the original cryptosystem, and now outdated, are about 500 Kbits
for the public key and 300 Kbits for the private key. The reason of such a large
amount comes from the fact that McEliece proposed to use as public key a gen-
erator matrix of a linear block code. He suggested to take a code that admits an
efficient decoding algorithm capable to correct up to a certain number of errors,
and then to hide its structure by applying two secret linear transformations: a
scrambling transformation that sends the chosen generator matrix to another one,
and a permutation matrix that reorders the coordinates. The resulting matrix is
then the public key. The private key consists in the two secret transformations and
the decoding algorithm.
Niederreiter also invented [19] a code-based asymmetric cryptosystem by
choosing to describe codes through a parity-check matrix. These two systems are
equivalent in terms of security [16]. Their security relies on two difficult problems:
the One-Wayness against Chosen-Plaintext Attack (OW-CPA) thanks to the diffi-
culty of decoding large random linear block codes, and the difficulty of guessing the
decoding algorithm from a hidden generator matrix. It is worthwhile mentioning
that the OW-CPA character is well established as long as appropriate parameters
are taken. This is due to two facts: first it is proven in [2] that decoding a ran-
dom linear code is NP-Hard, and second the best known algorithms [8, 3] and [20,
Volume I, Chapter 7] operate exponentially with the length n of the underlying
code (see [10] for more details). However, the second criteria is not always verified
by any class of codes that has a decoding algorithm. For instance, Sidel’nikov and
Shestakov proved in [22] that the structure of Generalised Reed-Solomon codes
of length n can be recovered in O
(
n3
)
(See for instance [24, page 39]). Sendrier
proved [27] that the permutation transformation can be extracted for concatenated
codes. Minder and Shokrollahi presented in [18] a structural attack that creates a
private key against a cryptosystem based on Reed-Muller codes [21].
However, despite these attacks on these variants of the McEliece cryptosys-
tem, the original scheme still remains resistant to any structural attack. Addition-
ally, the McEliece system and its Niederreiter homologue display better encryption
and decryption complexity than any other competing asymmetric schemes like
RSA. Unfortunately, they suffer from the same drawback namely, they need very
large key sizes as previously pointed out. It is therefore crucial to find a method
to reduce the representation of a linear code as well as the matrices of the linear
transformations.
A possible solution is to take very sparse matrices. This idea has been applied
in [5] which examined the implications of using Low Density Parity-Check (LDPC)
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codes. The authors showed that taking sparse matrices for the linear transforma-
tions is not a secure solution. Indeed, it is possible to recover the secret code from
the public parity-check matrix. Another idea due to [25] is to take subcodes of
an optimal code such as Generalized Reed-Solomon codes in order to decrease the
code rate. But a great care has to be taken in the choice of parameters because in
[26] it has been proved that some parameters are not secure. A recent trend ap-
peared in code-based public key cryptosystems that tries to use quasi-cyclic codes
[11, 1, 13, 12, 9]. This particular family of codes offers the advantage of having
a very simple and compact description. Many codewords can simply be obtained
by considering cyclic shifts of a sole codeword. Exploiting this fact leads to much
smaller public and private keys. Currently there exist two public-key cryptosys-
tems based upon quasi-cyclic codes. The first proposal [11] uses subcodes of a
primitive BCH cyclic code. The size of the public key for this cryptosystem is
about 20Kbits. The other one [1] tries to combine these two positive aspects by
requiring quasi-cyclic LDPC codes. It also avoids trivial attacks against McEliece
type cryptosystems based on LDPC codes by using in the secret key a more gen-
eral kind of invertible matrix instead of a permutation matrix. For this particular
system, the authors propose a public key size that is about 48Kbits.
In this work, we cryptanalyse these two cryptosystems. We show that the
cryptosystem of [11] is not secure because it is possible to recover the secret per-
mutation that is supposed to hide the structure of the secret quasi-cyclic code. We
prove it by producing many linear equations that the entries of the secret permu-
tation matrix have to satisfy by using the fact that the secret code is a subcode of
a known BCH code. This attack has been implemented and in all experiments we
have performed the solution space of the linear system was of dimension one and
revealed the permutation matrix.
In a second part, we also suggest a structural attack of [1] exploiting the
quasi-cyclic structure of the code and a certain weakness in the choice of the lin-
ear transformations that hide the generator matrix of the code. This cryptanalysis
adopts a polynomial-oriented approach and basically consists in searching for two
polynomials of low weight such that their product is a public polynomial. Our
analysis shows that with high probability a parity-check matrix of a punctured
version of the secret code can be recovered with time complexity O
(
n3
)
where n
is the length of the considered code. An implementation shows that this recovery
can be done in about 140 seconds on a PC. The final step that consists in com-
pletely reconstructing the original parity-check matrix of the secret quasi-cyclic
low density parity-check code requires the search for low weight codewords which
can be done with about 237 operations for the specific parameters proposed.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall definitions
and basic properties of circulant matrices. Section 3 gives a description of how to
totally break the McEliece variant proposed in [11]. In Section 4 we propose a
method to totally cryptanalyse the scheme of [1]. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2. Notation and Definitions
2.1. Circulant Matrices
Let F2 be the finite field with two elements and denote by F2[x] the set of uni-
variate polynomials with coefficients in F2. Any p-bit vector v = (v0, . . . , vp−1) is
identified to the polynomial v(x) = v0 + · · · vp−1x
p−1. The support of a vector (or
a polynomial) v is the set of positions i such that vi is non-zero and the weight
wt(v) of v is the cardinality of its support. The intersection polynomial for any
two polynomials u(x) and v(x) is u(x) ⋆ v(x) =
∑
uivix
i.
A binary circulant matrix M is a p × p matrix obtained by cyclically right
shifting the first row:
M =


m0 m1 · · · mp−1
mp−1 m0 · · · mp−2
...
...
. . .
...
m1 m2 · · · m0

 . (1)
Thus any circulant matrix M is completely described by only its first row m =
(m0, . . . ,mp−1). Note that a circulant matrix is also obtained by cyclically down
shifting its first column. We shall see that the classical matrix operations of addi-
tion and multiplication preserve the circulant structure of matrices. It is possible
to characterise the i-th row of a circulant matrix M as the polynomial:
xi ·m(x) mod (xp − 1).
If one looks at the product b ×M of a circulant matrix M with a binary vector
b = (b0, . . . , bp−1) then it exactly corresponds to the p-bit vector represented by
the polynomial b(x) ·m(x) mod (xp − 1). This property naturally extends to the
product of two p× p circulant matrices M and N . Indeed, the first row of M ×N
is exactly m(x) ·n(x) mod (xp − 1) and the i-th row of M ×N is represented by
the polynomial:(
xi ·m(x)
)
· n(x) mod (xp − 1) = xi ·
(
m(x) · n(x)
)
mod (xp − 1).
We have therefore the following result.
Proposition 1. Let Cp be the set of binary p×p circulant matrices, then there exists
an isomorphism between the rings
(
Cp,+,×
)
and
(
F2[x]/(x
p − 1),+, ·
)
:
(
Cp,+,×
)
≃
(
F2[x]/(x
p − 1),+, ·
)
Remark 1. The first column of a circulant matrix M defined by m(x) corresponds
to the polynomial m⋆(x) = xp ·m( 1x) mod (x
p − 1).
Proposition 1 can be used to provide a simple characterisation of invertible
matrices of circulant matrices:
Proposition 2. A p × p circulant matrix M is invertible if and only if m(x) is
prime with xp − 1.
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Proof. One has only to prove that the invert of a circulant matrix M defined by a
polynomial m(x) of F2[x]/(x
p − 1) is necessarily a circulant matrix. Assume that
there exists N such that N ×M = M ×N = Ip with Ip being the p × p identity
matrix. Let n = (n0, . . . , np−1) be the first row of N . We have previously seen
that the product n×M can be seen as the polynomial n(x) ·m(x) mod (xp− 1).
This latter polynomial is equal to 1 by assumption. Consequently, for any i such
that 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1 we also have
(
xi · n(x)
)
· m(x) = xi mod (xp − 1) which
proves that the circulant matrix defined by n(x) is the invert of M . Therefore N
is circulant. 
A matrix G of size k×n is p-block circulant with k = k0p and n = n0p where
k0 and n0 are positive integers if there exist p × p circulant matrices Gi,j ∈ Cp
such that:
G =


G1,1 · · · G1,n0
...
...
Gk0,1 · · · Gk0,n0


It is straightforward to see that the set of block circulant matrices is stable by
matrix addition and matrix multiplication. It is therefore natural to establish an
identification between a block circulant matrix G with a polynomial k0×n0 matrix
G(x) with entries in F2[x]/(x
p−1) by means of the mapping that sends each block
Gi,j to the polynomial gi,j(x) defining it.
Proposition 3. Let B
p
k0,n0
be the set of p-block circulant matrices of size k0 × n0.
Let Rp = F2[x]/(x
p − 1) and define by Mk0,n0(Rp) the set of k0 × n0 matri-
ces with coefficients in Rp. There exists a ring isomorphism between B
p
k0,n0
and
Mk0,n0(Rp):
B
p
k0,n0
≃ Mk0,n0(Rp)
G 7−→ G(x).
In particular any p-block circulant matrix G is invertible if and only if
det(G)(x) is prime with xp − 1 and its inverse is also a p-block circulant matrix.
2.2. Cyclic and Quasi-Cyclic Codes
A (binary) linear code C of length n and dimension k is a k-dimensional vector
subspace of Fn2 . The elements of a code are called codewords. A generator matrix
G of C is a k′ × n matrix with k′ ≥ k whose rows generate C . A parity-check
matrix H of C is an r×n matrix with r ≥ n−k such that for any codeword c ∈ C
we have:
H × cT = 0.
It is well-known that if a generator matrix of C is of the form (I|A) where I is
the identity matrix then (AT |I) is a parity-check matrix for C . Such a generator
matrix is said to be in reduced echelon form. A code C ′ is said to be permutation
equivalent to C if there exists a permutation of the symmetric group of order n that
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reorders the coordinates of codewords of C ′ into codewords of C . It is convenient
to consider equivalent codes as the same code.
A cyclic code C of length n is an ideal of the ring F2[x]/(x
n − 1). Such a
code is characterised by a unique polynomial g(x) divisor of (xn− 1). Let r be the
degree of g(x). Any codeword c(x) is obtained as a product in F2[x] of the form:
c(x) = m(x) · g(x)
where m(x) is a polynomial of F2[x] of degree n − 1 − r. C is a linear code of
dimension k = n − r. The polynomial g(x) is called the generator polynomial of
the cyclic code C and we shall write C =< g(x) >.
A code C is quasi-cyclic of index p if there exists a generator matrix G that
is p-block circulant. We assume that all the Gi,j ’s are square matrices of size p× p
and therefore n = n0p and k = k0p. Cyclic codes of length n are thus quasi-cyclic
codes of index n where a generator matrix is a circulant matrix associated to its
generator polynomial.
A useful method developed in [11] for obtaining quasi-cyclic codes of length
n = pn0 and index p is to consider a cyclic code C generated by a polynomial
g(x) and construct the subcode Sn0(c) spanned by a codeword c(x) and its p− 1
shifts modulo (xn − 1) of n0 bits x
n0 · c(x), . . . , x(p−1)n0 · c(x). However note that
Sn0(c) does not admit a p-block circulant generator matrix. Actually, one has to
consider the equivalent code of C obtained with the permutation π that maps any
an0 + b to bp + a with 1 ≤ a ≤ p − 1 and 0 ≤ b ≤ n0 − 1. It means that up
to a permutation any codeword c(x) of a cyclic code C can be seen as a vector
c = (c0, . . . , cn0−1) where each ci belongs to F
p
2 ≃ F2[x]/(x
p−1) and such that the
vector c′ = (c′0, . . . , c
′
n0−1) with c
′
j(x) = x ·cj(x) mod (x
p− 1) is also a codeword
of Sn0(c).
3. A McEliece Cryptosystem Based on Subcodes of a BCH Code
3.1. Description
Let C0 be a cyclic code of length n = pn0 and let k be the dimension of C0. Assume
that C0 admits an k
′ × n generator matrix with k′ ≥ k and such that k′ = pk0.
For simplicity, we set k′ = k. Let c1(x), c2(x),. . . ,ck0−1(x) be random codewords
of C0 and consider the linear code C defined as:
C = Sn0(c1) + · · · + Sn0(ck0−1).
We assume that C is of dimension k − p = p(k0 − 1). Recall from Section 2.2
that up to a permutation any n-bit vector ci(x) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k0 − 1 can be seen
as a vector (ci,0, . . . , ci,n0−1) where each ci,j can also be seen as an element of
F2[x]/(x
p − 1). Thus C is a quasi-cyclic code of index p whose generator matrix
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G(x) in p-block circulant form is:
G(x) =


c1,1(x) · · · c1,n0(x)
...
...
ck0−1,1(x) · · · ck0−1,n0(x)

 .
The variant of the McEliece cryptosystem proposed in [11] starts from a
secret subcode C of dimension p(k0 − 1) of a primitive BCH code C0 obtained
by the method explained above. A secret permutation π of the symmetric group
of order n0 hides the structure of C while keeping its quasi-cyclic structure by
publicly making available a generator matrix Gπ(x) defined by:
Gπ(x) =


c1,π(1)(x) · · · c1,π(n0)(x)
...
...
ck0−1,π(1)(x) · · · ck0−1,π(n0)(x)

 .
The cyclic code C0 given in [11] is a primitive BCH of length 2
m − 1 and dimen-
sion n − tm where t is a positive integer. Two sets of parameters are proposed
respectively corresponding to 2100 and 280 security levels.
• Parameters A: m = 12, t = 26, p = 91, n0 = 45, and k0 = 43.
• Parameters B: m = 11, t = 31, p = 89, n0 = 23 and k0 = 21.
Note that we always have p > n0. This property will be useful for cryptanalyzing
the cryptosystem.
3.2. Structural Cryptanalysis
We describe a method that recovers the secret permutation π of the cryptosystem
of [11] and thus reveals the secret key of any user. It exploits three facts:
1. The code C0 admits a binary (n − k) × n parity check matrix H0 which
can be assumed to be known. There are only a few different primitive BCH
codes for a given parameter set (n,m, t) and we can try all of them. This
is a consequence of the fact that the number of such codes is clearly upper-
bounded by the number of primitive polynomials of degree m. For instance
for the parameter set B, this number is equal to 176.
2. Since C is a subcode of C0, any n-bit codeword c of C must satisfy the
equation:
H0 × c
T = 0. (2)
3. Permuting through a permutation π the columns of a polynomial generator
matrix G(x) of C can also be translated into a matrix product by the asso-
ciated n0 × n0 permutation matrix Π of π. Note that Π can also be seen as
a polynomial matrix Π(x) ∈ Bpn0,n0 where 0 (resp. 1) entry corresponds to 0
(resp. 1) constant polynomial so that we have:
Gπ(x) = G(x) ×Π(x). (3)
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Note that Equation (3) can be rewritten as an equality between binary p-
block circulant matrices:
Gπ = G× Π, (4)
where Gπ is the (k− p)×n public generator matrix and Π = Π⊗ Ip with Ip
being the p×p identity matrix. Finding Π actually amounts to solve a linear
system of n20 unknowns representing the entries of Π
−1 such that:
H0 ×
(
Gπ ×Π−1
)T
= 0. (5)
In other words, each row of the public matrix Gπ after being permuted by
Π−1 must satisfy Equation (2). This is a linear system since Π−1 may be
rewritten asΠ−1⊗Ip. This means that each row of G
π provides (n−k) binary
linear equations verified by Π−1. Thus Equation (5) gives a total number of
(k − p)(n− k) linear equations that must be satisfied by n20 unknowns.
The cryptanalysis of [11] amounts to solve an over-constrained linear system consti-
tuted of p2(k0−1)(n0−k0) equations and n
2
0 unknowns since as we have remarked
that p > n0. For instance, Parameters B give 529 unknowns that should satisfy
316, 840 equations. As for Parameters A we obtain 2, 025 unknowns that satisfy
695, 604 equations. Many of these equations are obviously linearly dependent. The
success of this method heavily depends on the size of the solution vector space.
An implementation in Magma software actually always gave in both cases a vector
space of dimension one. This revealed the secret permutation.
4. A Cryptosystem Based on Quasi-Cyclic LDPC Codes
4.1. Description
LDPC codes are linear codes defined by sparse binary parity-check matrices. We
assume as in [1] that n = pn0 and k = p(n0 − 1), and we consider a parity-check
matrix H of the following form:
H =
(
H1 · · · Hn0
)
(6)
where each matrix Hj is a sparse circulant matrix of size p × p. Without loss of
generality, Hn0 is chosen to have full rank. Each column of H has a fixed weight dv
which is very small compared to the length n. We also assume that one has a good
approximation of the number t of correctable errors through iterative decoding of
the code defined by H .
The quasi-cyclic LDPC cryptosystem proposed in [1] takes two invertible p-
block circulant matrices S and Q of size k× k and n× n respectively. The matrix
S (resp. Q) is chosen such that the weight of each row and each column is s (resp.
m). The private key consists of the parity-check matrix H and the matrices S and
Q. In order to produce the public key, one has to compute a generator matrix
G′ in reduced echelon form and make public the matrix G = S−1 × G′ × Q−1.
The plaintext space is the set Fk2 and the ciphertext space is F
n
2 . If one wishes to
encrypt a message x ∈ Fk2 , one has to randomly choose a n-bit vector e of weight
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t′ ≤ t/m and compute c = x×G+ e. The decryption step consists in iteratively
decoding c×Q = x×S−1×G′+e×Q to output z = x×S−1 and then computing
x = z × S. The crucial point that makes this cryptosystem valid is that e×Q is
a correctable error because its weight is less than or equal to t′m.
4.2. Some Remarks on the Choice of the Parameters
The authors suggest to take a matrix Q in diagonal form. They also suggest the
following values: p = 4032, n0 = 4, dv = 13 , m = 7 and t = 190 (t
′ = 27). Finally,
each block circulant matrix of S has a column/row weight equals to m so as to
have s = m(n0 − 1). Unfortunately, for this specific constraint, there is a flaw in
this choice because the matrix S is not invertible. This follows from the fact that
in this case x − 1 always divides det(S)(x) which is therefore not coprime with
xp − 1 and this implies that S(x) is not invertible. This can be proved by using
the following arguments.
Lemma 1. Let S(x) = (si,j(x)) in Mn0−1,n0−1(Rp) and define the binary matrix
S˜ = (s˜i,j) by s˜i,j = wt(si,j) mod 2. We have then:
det(S˜) = wt(det(S)) mod 2.
Proof. This comes from the fact that wt(u+ v) = wt(u) + wt(v)− 2wt(u ⋆ v) for
any u(x) and v(x) in F2[x] which implies that:{
wt(u+ v) = wt(u) + wt(v) mod 2
wt(u · v) = wt(u) · wt(v) mod 2.

Proposition 4. For any S(x) in M3,3(Rp) such that each si,j is of weight m then
x− 1 divides det(S)(x).
Proof. By using the same notation as in the previous lemma we know that det(S˜)
is equal to zero since S˜ is the all one matrix. From the previous lemma it follows
that det(S)(x) has a support of even weight. This implies that x − 1 divides
det(S)(x). 
In order to avoid this situation we introduce as few polynomials of weight
different from m in S such that det(S˜) = 1. A possible choice is the following one.
First we choose a nonsingular S˜ equal to
S˜ =

 1 1 11 0 1
0 1 1


When s˜ij = 1 we choose the corresponding entry sij(x) to be of weight m and if
s˜ij = 0 we choose the corresponding entry sij(x) to be of weight m− 1.
It should also be mentioned that a decoding attack searching for a word of
weight less than t = 27 in a code of length n = 16128 and dimension k = 12096
as proposed by using the algorithm given in [6] has a work factor of about 278.5.
Note that this work factor may even be decreased with the algorithm of [7].
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4.3. Structural Attack
4.3.1. Preliminaries. The goal of this attack is to recover the secret code C defined
by the parity-check matrix H given in Equation (6). We know that S and Q are
equivalently defined by polynomials si,j(x) and qi,j(x) respectively. Q is chosen to
be in diagonal form, that is to say qi,j(x) = 0 if i 6= j. For the sake of simplicity, we
set qi(x) = qi,i(x). Moreover the polynomials qi(x) are invertible modulo x
p − 1
since Q is invertible. It is also straightforward to remark that the secret generator
matrix G′ is equal to:
G′ =


(H−1n0 H1)
T
Ik
...
(H−1n0 Hn0−1)
T

 .
In others words, if we denote by G≤k the matrix obtained by taking the k first
columns of G then we have:
G≤k = S
−1 ×


Q−11 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 Q−1n0−1

 .
This implies that G−1≤k is a p-block circulant matrix defined by polynomials gi,j(x)
that satisfies the following equations:
gi,j(x) = qi(x) · si,j(x) mod (x
p − 1). (7)
Note that the weight of gi,j(x) is at most m
2. Actually, due the fact that the
secret polynomials have very low weights, we shall see that the support of gi,j(x)
is exactly m2 with a good probability. For the sake of simplicity, we set qi(x) =
xe1+ · · · +xem and si,j(x) = x
ℓ1+ · · · +xℓm with 0 ≤ ea ≤ p−1 and 0 ≤ ℓa ≤ p−1
for any 1 ≤ a ≤ m. We fix qi(x) and we assume that the monomials x
ℓa of si,j(x)
are independently and uniformly chosen. We wish to estimate the probability that
the support of gi,j(x) contains the support of at least one shift x
ℓa ·qi(x), and the
probability that the weight of gi,j(x) is exactly m
2.
Lemma 2. Let ℓ1, . . . , ℓw be w different integers such that 0 ≤ ℓa ≤ p − 1 for
1 ≤ a ≤ w. For any random integer 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ p − 1 such that ℓ is different from
ℓ1, . . . , ℓw, we have:
Pr
{(
xℓ1 + · · · + xℓw
)
· qi(x) ⋆ x
ℓ · qi(x) 6= 0
}
≤ w
m(m− 1)
p− w
Proof. Set first r(x) =
(
xℓ1 + · · · + xℓw
)
· qi(x). By the union bound we have:
Pr
{
r(x) ⋆ xℓ · qi(x) 6= 0
}
≤
w∑
a=1
Pr
{
xℓa · qi(x) ⋆ x
ℓ · qi(x) 6= 0
}
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The probability Pr
{
xℓa · qi(x) ⋆ x
ℓ · qi(x) 6= 0
}
is at most the fraction of integers
ℓ different from ℓ1, . . . , ℓw such that there exist 1 ≤ b ≤ m and 1 ≤ c ≤ m with:
ℓa + eb = ℓ+ ec mod p.
Thus, this fraction is given by the ratio of the number of pairs (eb, ec) with b 6= c
to the number of possible values for ℓ which is exactly m(m− 1)/(p− w). 
Proposition 5. The probability Pr
{
xℓ · qi(x) ⊂ gi,j(x)
}
for ℓ in {ℓ1, . . . , ℓm} that
the support of gi,j(x) contains the support of x
ℓ · qi(x) is lower-bounded by:
Pr
{
xℓ · qi(x) ⊂ gi,j(x)
}
≥
(
1−
m(m− 1)
p− 1
)m−1
.
Proof. This inequality is obtained by taking w = 1 in Lemma 2 and by the inde-
pendence of the choice of the (m− 1) other monomials of si,j(x). 
Proposition 6. The probability q that gi,j(x) is exactly of weight m
2 is lower-
bounded by:
q ≥
m−1∏
w=1
(
1− w ·
m(m− 1)
p− w
)
.
Proof. For any 2 ≤ w ≤ m, let Ew denote the event that
Ew : (x
ℓ1 + · · · + xℓw−1) · qi(x) ⋆ x
ℓw · qi(x) = 0
when each monomial xℓa is uniformly and independently chosen. We also set E1
as the whole universe. Then we have:
q ≥ Pr {E2 ∩ · · · ∩ Em}
Using Bayes’ rule we also have
Pr {E2 ∩ · · · ∩ Em} =
m∏
w=1
Pr {Ew|Ew−1 ∩ · · · ∩ E1} .
But by Lemma 2 we know that Pr {Ew|Ew−1 ∩ · · · ∩ E1} ≥
(
1− w · m(m−1)p−w
)
. 
4.3.2. Different Strategies.
First Strategy. We have seen in Lemma 2 that the support of gi,j(x) contains
with very high probability the support of at least1 a shifted version of qi(x) since
for the parameters given in [1], we obtain Pr
{
xℓ · qi(x) ⊂ gi,j(x)
}
≥ 0.94. One
possible strategy to recover the polynomial qi(x) consists in enumerating m-tuples
u1, . . . , um that belong in the support of gi,j(x) in order to form u(x) =
∑
a x
ua
such that u−1(x)·gi,j′ (x) is of weightm for 1 ≤ j
′ ≤ n0−1. The cost of this attack
is O
((
m2
m
)
· p2
)
which corresponds to 250.3 operations for the specific parameters
proposed.
1Actually, the support of gi,j(x) contains with good probability all the supports of x
ℓa · qi(x)
with 1 ≤ a ≤ m since q ≥ 0.79 for the proposed parameters.
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Second Strategy. We present another strategy that can be used to recover secret
matrices S and thus matrices Q1, . . . , Qn0−1. This strategy requires to search for
codewords of very low weight in a linear code. The most efficient algorithm that
accomplishes this task is the algorithm of [3] which improves upon Stern’s algo-
rithm [23]. However in order to derive a simple bound on the time complexity, we
consider this second algorithm as in [1]. The work factor Ωn,k,w of Stern’s algo-
rithm to find Aw codewords of weight w in a code of length n and dimension k
satisfies Ωk,n,w ≥
N
AwPw
where (g, ℓ) are two parameters and N is the number of
binary operations required for each iteration
N = (n− k)3/2 + k(n− k)2 + 2gℓ
(
k/2
g
)
+ 2g(n− k)
(
k/2
g
)2
2ℓ
. (8)
Pw represents the probability of finding a given codeword of weight w
Pw =
(
w
g
)(
n−w
k/2−g
)
(
n
k/2
)
(
w−g
g
)(n−k/2−w+g
k/2−g
)
(n−k/2
k/2
)
(
n−k−w+2g
ℓ
)
(
n−k
ℓ
) .
Recall that G−1≤k is specified by polynomials gi,j(x). Let di,j(x) be the polynomial
gi,j(x) · g
−1
i,1 (x) mod (x
p − 1) and consider the code Ei defined by the following
generator matrix:
Ei =
(
Ip Di,2 · · · Di,n0−1
)
where as usual the circulant matrix Di,j is characterised by the polynomial di,j(x).
Then Ei contains at least p codewords of low weight (n0 − 1)m = 21 since
Si,1 × Ei =
(
Si,1 Si,2 · · · Si,n0−1
)
.
It is therefore possible to recover matrices Si,1, . . . , Si,n0−1 with a complexity of
232 operations by applying Stern’s algorithm with (g, ℓ) = (3, 43) in order to find
a codeword of weight 21 in a code of dimension p and length (n0 − 1)p = 12096.
4.3.3. Extraction of the Secret Code. After recovering S, Q1, . . . , Qn0−1, one is
therefore able to compute the following generator matrix G˜ defined by:
G˜ = G′ ×


Ip 0 · · · 0
0
. . .
. . .
...
...
. . . Ip 0
0 · · · 0 Q−1n0

 =


A1
Ik
...
An0−1


where for 1 ≤ i ≤ n0 − 1, we set Ai = (H
−1
n0 ×Hi)
T × Q−1n0 . Recall that matrices
H1, . . . , Hn0 and Qn0 are still unknown. However, one can easily check that for any
different i and j, we also have (Ai×A
−1
j )
T = Hi×H
−1
j whenever Hj is invertible.
Thus, if we set Bi,j = (Ai × A
−1
j )
T then for a fixed 1 ≤ i ≤ n0 − 1 and for any
different integers j and j′, we have that Hj × Bi,j = Hj′ × Bi,j′ = Hi. Consider
now the code defined by the following generator matrix G1:
G1 =
(
Ip B2,1 · · · Bn0−1,1
)
.
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It is easy to see that H1 ×G1 =
(
H1 H2 · · · Hn0−1
)
. This also means that
G1 spans a code with a minimum distance that is smaller than (n0 − 1)dv. There-
fore, by applying dedicated algorithms ([8] or [20, Volume I, Chapter 7]) searching
for codewords of small weight, it is possible to recover matrices H1, . . . , Hn0−1.
For instance, the work factor of Stern’s algorithm for searching codewords of
weight (n0 − 1)dv = 3 ∗ 13 = 39 in a code of dimension p = 4032 and length
p(n0 − 1) = 12096 is about 2
37 operations with (g, ℓ) = (3, 43).
Finally, we are able to compute (HTi )
−1 × Ai = (H
−1
n0 )
T × Q−1n0 for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n0 − 1. Inverting this matrix and applying again the second strategy
presented in Section 4.3.2, it is possible to find the matrices Hn0 and Qn0 .
4.4. Example
We illustrate the previously described attacks with some randomly generated poly-
nomials si,j(x) and qi,j(x) of weight m = 7 and degree less than p = 4032 as given
in [1]. We only put the exponents of the monomials that intervene in the expression
of the polynomials. Recall that some coefficients si,j(x) has to be of even weight
(actually of weight m − 1 = 6) in order to generate an invertible matrix S. We
implemented the attack in MAGMA software [4]. The running time on a Pentium
4 (2.80GHz) with 500 Mbytes RAM for the second strategy is 140 seconds. The
last step that consists in recovering the secret LDPC code is performed by apply-
ing Canteaut-Chabaud algorithm. The work factor of this operation is about 236
operations. Our implementation in MAGMA software finds a codeword of weight
(n0 − 1)dv = 39 in about 15 minutes.
H1 = [213, 457, 1467, 1702, 1786, 2015, 2155, 2197, 2569, 2744, 2823, 2902, 3710]
H2 = [6, 626, 868, 1102, 1564, 1894, 2401, 2595, 2982, 3570, 3605, 3771, 3835]
H3 = [615, 639, 1198, 1513, 1712, 1850, 1941, 2397, 2553, 3074, 3373, 3798, 3960]
H4 = [135, 149, 241, 735, 1265, 2075, 2869, 3111, 3218, 3625, 3760, 3785, 3969]
S1,1 = [24, 274, 334, 2025, 2574, 2661, 3601]
S1,2 = [512, 1177, 2524, 2526, 2904, 2968, 3340]
S1,3 = [930, 1175, 1210, 1459, 2200, 2303, 2811]
S2,1 = [503, 1258, 1632, 1658, 2055, 2221, 2764]
S2,2 = [989, 1256, 2568, 2625, 2906, 3139]
S2,3 = [561, 616, 2499, 2787, 2835, 3061, 3865]
S3,1 = [177, 465, 1659, 1958, 2795, 3605]
S3,2 = [419, 461, 1540, 2262, 2435, 3474, 3587]
S3,3 = [554, 1119, 1307, 2018, 2193, 2631, 3755]
Q1 = [456, 578, 1551, 1562, 1992, 2919, 3476]
Q2 = [250, 268, 897, 1782, 2127, 3163, 3378]
Q3 = [14, 1132, 1672, 1716, 2164, 2723, 3409]
Q4 = [443, 593, 2401, 2615, 2981, 3612, 3993]
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5. Conclusion
The idea to introduce quasi-cyclic codes and quasi-cyclic low density parity-check
codes is motivated by practical concerns to reduce key sizes of McEliece cryptosys-
tem. The first variant of [11] uses quasi-cyclic codes obtained from subcodes of a
cyclic BCH code. The other variant of [1] uses quasi-cyclic low density parity-check
codes. However, we have shown here that the cost of these two attempts at re-
ducing key size is made at the expense of the security. Indeed, we have presented
different structural cryptanalysis of these two variants of McEliece cryptosystem.
The first attack is applied to the variant of [11] and extracts the secret permuta-
tion supposed to hide the structure of the secret codes. We show that the secret
key recovery amounts to solve an over-constrained linear system. The second at-
tack accomplishes a total break of [1]. In the first phase, we look for divisors of
low weight of a given public polynomial. The last phase recovers the secret parity
check matrix of the secret quasi-cyclic low density parity-check code by looking
for low weight codewords in a punctured version of the secret code. An implemen-
tation shows that the first phase can be accomplished in about 140 seconds and
the second phase in about 15 minutes.
However these results cannot be applied to the original McEliece’s scheme
using Goppa codes which represents up to now the only unbroken scheme. An open
problem which would be desirable to solve is to come up with a way of reducing
significantly the key sizes in this type of public-key cryptosystem by maintaining
the security intact.
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